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NOTE AND COMMENT
THE LIABILITY OV CHARITABLE CORPORATIoNs FOR THE TORTS Or THEIR
SXRVATs.-This question was discussed quite fully in the last number of the
Pvirw, pp. 552-559, under the title Liability of Hospitals for the Negligence
of their Physicians and Nurses, particular attention being given to the reasons
underlying the doctrine that charitable corporations are not liable for the
negligence of their servants, provided proper care has been exercised in their
selection, and to the limitations within which that doctrine should be confined.
It was concluded that the true reason for the doctrine is not to be found,
as many cases apparently hold, in the inviolability of trust funds, or, as some
hold, in the exercise of a sound public policy, but rather in the contract
relation which those who receive the benefits of the charity occupy toward
such funds, and that the doctrine should be limited in its application to those
who have expressly contracted that they will not hold the corporation liable
for the negligence of its servants and those who, by accepting the benefits
of the charity, impliedly contract that they will not, provided proper care has
-been exercised in the selection of such servants. Among the cases cited in
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support of the proposition that public charities are not liable for the negli-
gence of servants on account of the inviolability of trust funds was that of
Downes v. Harper Hospital, ioi Mich. 555, 6o N. W. Rep. 42, 25 L. R. A.
6o2, 45 Am. St. Rep. 427. Apparently this case stood for that doctrine. At
all events, it had been frequently cited as authority for the doctrine. But in
the recent case of Bruce v. Central Methodist Episcopal Church, decided by
the Michigan Supreme Court, March 5, i9o7, and reported in iio N. W. Rep.
,95i, the Downes Case is distinguished and its apparent doctrine materially
limited. The writer of the note in the last number of the Rxmw had not,
at the time of its preparation, seen the case of Bruce v. Central Methodist
Episcopal Church, and did not have the advantage of the excellent opinions
filed therein, but it is quite apparent that they were inspired by the exhaustive
opinion that inspired the note, namely, that of Juv LowELL in Powers v.
Massachusetts Homaopathic Hospital, 47 C. C. A. 122, io9 Fed. Rep. 294,
65 L. R. A. 372.
In Bruce v. Central Methodist Episcopal thurch, plaintiff brought his
action for injuries received while he was at work for a contractor tinting the
ceiling of defendant's church edifice, the injury being caused by the breaking
of a scaffolding furnished by defendant and which was defective owing to
defendant's negligence. It was claimed that the defendant was a public char-
itable organization and that, under the doctrine of the Downes Case, its
funds could not be used to satisfy a judgment for the negligent acts of its
servants. While recognizing defendant as a charitable organization and that
it is the law that the funds of such an organization cannot be used ordinarily
for purposes other than those contemplated by the founders, the court main-
tained that the immunity was limited to the cases of those who had been
beneficiaries of the charity, the reason of the limitation being that when such
parties accept the benefits of the charity, they enter into a relation by which
they impliedly contract that they will assume the risks arising from the negli-
gence of the servants of the charity, if due care has been exercised in the
selection of such servants.
Commenting upon the Downes Case, Jusnac CAMZNTIM in his opinion
says: "There is this distinction between Downes v. Harper Hospital and this
case, viz.: in the Downes Case plaintiff was a patient in defendant's hospital
and, therefore, a beneficiary of the charitable trust administered by the hos-
pital corporation, while in this case, he was an employee of defendant's con-
tractor, and not a beneficiary of the trust administered by defendant. If we
hold that the principle of the Downes Case applies to the case at bar, we
must declare that that principle exempts a corporation administering a
charitable trust from all liability for the torts of its agents, and as a corpora-
tion can act only by and through its agents, that it is exempt from all liability
whatsoever for torts. What is the principle underlying the Downes Case?
Does it exempt a corporation administering a charitable trust from all liability
for torts? Those who answer this question in the affirmative cannot support
their position by appealing to the reasoning of the opinion in that case. While
that opinion says, 'the law jealously guards thie charitable trust fund, and
does not permit it to be frittered away by the negligent acts of those employed
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in its execution,' the pith of its reasoning in my judgment is contained in the,
following words: 'It certainly follows that the fund cannot be indirectly
diverted by the tortious or negligent acts of the managers of the fund, or
their employes, though such acts result in damages to an innocent beneficiary.
Those voluntarily accepting the benefit of the charity accept it upon this
condition."'
JusTIcP CARPZNMR then proceeds to determine the true principle under-
lying the Downes Case, and after citing numerous authorities, continues:
"In the latest of these cases (Powers v. Mass. Hoinuopathic Hospital)
the opinion is exhaustive and elaborate and discusses nearly all authorities-
it is held that the ground upon which liability is denied is that of assumed
risk, the court saying: 'One who accepts the benefit of a public or of a
private charity enters into a relation which exempts his benefactor from
liability for the negligence of his servants in administering the charity; at
any rate if the benefactor has used due care in selecting those servants.' If
this is correct it is scarcely necessary to say that that principle has no appli-
cation to the case at bar. Is it correct?
"The ground upon which liability is denied in nearly all the foregoing
cases is that stated in the Downes Case, viz.: that it would thwart the purpose
of the trust; that is, it would oppose the will of the founder of the trust to
pay from the trust funds damages caused by an agent's torts. It is entirely
logical to say that this will must be recognized by beneficiaries of the trust.
It may justly be said that the benefit of the trust is extended to them and
accepted by them upon the implied condition that they shall recognize that
will.. By becoming beneficiaries they agree to recognize it. But I can see
no ground upon which it may be held that the rights of those who are not
beneficiaries of a trust can in any way be affected by the will of its founder.
The rights of such persons are those created by the general laws, and the
duty of those administering the trust to respect those rights are also created
by general laws. The doctrine that the will of an individual shall exempt
either persons or property from the operation of general laws is inconsistent
with the fundamental idea of government. It permits the will of the subject
to nullify the will of the people. Nor can I conceive any ground upon which
a court can hold that effect can be given to that will when it relates to prop-
erty devised or conveyed for the purpose of a charitable trust. Such a hold-
ing must rest upon the argument that the advantages reaped by the public
from such trusts justify the exemption; that is, as applied to this case, the
advantages to the public justify defendant's exemption from liability for
wrongs done to individuals. If this argument is sound-and its soundness
may be questioned, for there are those who will deny that the advantages to
the public justify the wrong to the individual-it should be addressed to the
legislative and not to the judicial department of the government. It is our
duty as judges to apply the law. We have no authority to create exemptions
or to declare immunity. * * * * * * * * * *
"I conclude from this reasoning that corporations administering a char-
itable trust, like all other corporations, are subject to the general laws of the
land, and cannot, therefore claim exemption from responsibility for the torts
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of their agents, unless that claim is based on a contract with the person
injured by such a tort, and that Downes v. Harper Hospital, and other similar
cases are consistent with this rule. They rest upon the principle correctly
stated in Powers v. Mass. Homeopathic Hospital, supra, viz.: that the bene-
ficiary of such charitable trust enters into a contract whereby he assumes the
risk of such torts. It is not surprising that years should have elapsed before
the correct legal principle governing these cases was announced in Powers v.
Mass. Homreopathic Hospital. The discovery of correct legal principles, like
the discovery of scientific and social truths, requires time and patient investi-
gation."
The holding of the court in this case, resulting, as it does, in the limita-
tion of the apparent doctrine of the Downes Case, is undoubtedly correct.
The case defines and limits, in a clear and unmistakable way, the immunity
of charities for the negligent acts of agents and servants. H. B. H.
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